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Abstract
Since 1990, both the United Nations and the United States have promoted democratic
nation-building in conflict areas. However, despite the common goal of creating stable democracies, the two entities have often worked at cross purposes. Following the 1993 debacle in
Somalia, the United States largely deserted UN nation-building efforts and moved toward
unilateral democracy promotion. Over the next decade US efforts were directed at establishing Lockean procedural democracies, defined largely in terms of civil and political institutions. In UN parlance, however, democracy has taken on a holistic meaning that provides for
the inclusion of social, economic, and cultural factors. This definitional dissonance, coupled
with American conservative hostility toward UN democratic nation-building, undermines
the effectiveness of UN efforts. US unilateral democracy promotion has proven largely ineffective as well. Democratization would be far better served by US support for on-going UN
nation-building.
Las relaciones US–UN y la promoción de la democracia
Desde 1990, Naciones Unidas y Estados Unidos han promovido la democracia en zonas conflictivas. Sin embargo, a pesar del propósito común de crear democracias estables, las dos entidades han trabajado de manera distinta. Desde el debacle de 1993 en Somalia, los Estados
Unidos abandonaron los esfuerzos colectivos y actuaron unilateralmente. En la década
siguiente sus esfuerzos se dirigieron a establecer democracias procesales, al estilo Locke, definidas principalmente en términos de instituciones civiles y políticas. En la terminología de las
Naciones Unidas, sin embargo, la democracia se entiende en sentido global, incluyendo factores sociales, económicos y culturales. Esta disonancia, junto a la hostilidad americana hacia las
Naciones Unidas, aminora la efectividad de sus esfuerzos. La promoción unilateral de la
democracia ha sido además ineficaz. La democratización sería mejor servida si los Estados
Unidos apoyaran la acción de las Naciones Unidas.
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Le rapport des Etats-Unis et l’ONU et la promotion bâtiment de nation
Depuis 1990, les Nations Unies et les Etats-Unis favorisent le bâtiment de nation démocratique dans des régions de conflit. Cependant, en dépit du but commun de créer des démocraties stables, les deux entités se sont souvent contrarié dans leurs buts et méthodes. Après le
débâcle en Somalie en 1993, les Etats-Unis ont largement abandonné des efforts de batiment
de nation de l’ONU et se sont déplacés vers la promotion unilatérale de démocratie. Pendant
le décennie suivant, les efforts ont été dirigés à établir des démocraties procédurales dans le
cadre de Locke, définies en termes d’institutions civiles et politiques. En même temps, dans le
langage de l’ONU, la démocratie a pris une signification holistique qui prévoit l’inclusion des
facteurs sociaux, économiques, et culturels. Ce dissonance definitionnel, couplé à l’hostilité
conservatrice américaine vers le bâtiment de nation démocratique de l’ONU, mine l’efficacité
des efforts de l’ONU. En grande partie, la promotion unilatérale de démocratie des Etats-Unis
a prouvé aussi bien inefficace. La démocratisation serait meilleur servie par le soutien des Etatsunis du bâtiment de nation en cours de l’ONU
Keywords
United Nations, democracy, nation-building, global governance

Introduction
“So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic
movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending
tyranny in our world.”
– US President George W. Bush, Second Inaugural Address, 20 January 2005.
“(The goal of the United Nations is) to strengthen the capacity of all our countries to
implement the principles and practices of democracy and human rights, including
minority rights.”
– UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Road Map Towards the Implementation of the
United Nations Millennium Declaration, 6 September 2001.

For nearly two decades the United Nations has pursued “nation-building” as
an integral part of its peacekeeping missions. Revising earlier conceptions of
peacekeeping, recent UN interventions have had among their goals reordering domestic societies, addressing internal human rights violations, and
introducing democratic practices, often in opposition to the wishes of indigenous governments. These “second-generation” peacekeeping operations
reflect a post-Cold War preoccupation with a new philosophical orientation
in UN purposes, and a realization that international peace and security
depends more heavily now than in the past on the maintenance of viable,
stable, and popularly supported governments. Cold War UN neutrality
between socialist and capitalist prescriptions for good government has given
way to full acceptance of western theories of the democratic state.
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Simultaneously the United States, the UN’s most important member, has
made democracy promotion a central tenet of its activist foreign policy. From
Ronald Reagan’s confrontation with the communist world to George H.W.
Bush’s “New World Order,” Bill Clinton’s policy of democratic enlargement,
and George W. Bush’s promotion of democracy in the Middle East and elsewhere, the US government has given high priority to democratic governance.
Furthermore, the focus of this American effort has been precisely in those
regions of the world faced with failed states, internal conflicts, and traditional authoritarian rule – paralleling the geography of UN peacekeeping.
Given the symmetry of UN peacekeeping goals and American foreign
policy, it would seem reasonable that broad US support for the United
Nations would be forthcoming. Yet, the last twenty years have witnessed
deep tensions in the US–UN relationship that have weakened both actors’
ability to promote democratization. This anomalous circumstance has produced diminished American involvement in UN nation-building missions,
calls for dramatic reform in the United Nations itself, and a unilateral tendency in American democratization initiatives, most recently in Iraq. Furthermore, in the promotion of democratic nation-building the United
Nations increasingly has acted not as an intergovernmental organization that
is a composite of its member states but rather as a separate actor, often challenging US democratization efforts. This contentious circumstance raises
important questions about the potential for international democracy promotion by either international organizations or major democratic states,
about the perceived value of the United Nations to American foreign policy
in the 21st century, and about the evolving character of the post-Cold War
United Nations.

The UN’s Promotion of Democracy
Beginning in the late 1980s, the United Nations sought to introduce democratic practices – most particularly regular elections, human rights protection, good governance practices, and popular participation – in post-conflict
areas. First during the secretary-generalship of Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, and
then under his two successors Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan, UN
peacekeeping moved beyond merely separating combatants to rebuilding
domestic governments and internal civil societies. In June 1992, BoutrosGhali spelled out this ambitious program of UN-sponsored democratic
nation-building in his report An Agenda for Peace. Boutros-Ghali urged the
United Nations to identify “at risk” states and to act early in order to avoid
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the collapse of state sovereignty and internal order, particularly in Asia and
Africa.1 Paramount for Boutros-Ghali was the democratization of states that
had long suffered under authoritarian governments.
The first UN democratization initiatives in post-conflict settings were in
Namibia (1989) and Cambodia (1992). In Namibia the United Nations
took full administrative control of the former South African mandate region,
ultimately presiding over elections and the transfer of power to an independent government. With the strong support of the United States and the
other permanent members of the UN Security Council, the Council established the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) to
guide the independence process. UNTAG educated and registered voters,
and oversaw the 1989 elections for a constituent assembly. UNTAG declared
the elections – in which 96% of eligible Namibians voted and the South
West African Peoples’ Organization (SWAPO) won a majority – to be free
and fair. On March 21, 1990, Namibia achieved full independence and
UNTAG left the country. The UN operation’s success served as a model for
succeeding missions in Central America – El Salvador and Guatemala2 – and
Asia, particularly in Cambodia.
Cambodia had been in political and military turmoil since the end of the
Vietnam War. However, Cold War considerations gave the United Nations
little room to maneuver in proposing or enforcing an internal settlement.
Only with the end of US–Soviet confrontation and increased international
cooperation in the early 1990s could the UN play a critical role in facilitating
Cambodian democratic stability. By August 1990, the permanent members
of the Security Council reached agreement on a framework for a political
settlement. After a series of meetings to negotiate the details, the Security
Council authorized the dispatch of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). UNTAC took on an unprecedented set of
responsibilities to institutionalize the reconciliation of the parties. It managed daily administration of Cambodian foreign and defense policy, provided domestic government services, and stationed more than 20,000 UN
personnel in the country. UNTAC administered the first round of Cambodian elections in May 1993. The United States provided extensive electoral
assistance through the semi-public National Democratic and International
Republican Institutes. These organizations trained Cambodian parties on

1)
2)

Boutros-Ghali 1992.
For coverage of these two countries, see Moore and Pubantz 2002, pp. 104, 131.
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campaign management and party organizational issues.3 UNTAC in turn
drafted the election law and trained 50,000 election officials.
A power-sharing government came to office that lasted until prime minister Hun Sen carried out a coup in 1997. The refocusing of the world community on other crises and America’s growing distaste for nation-building
operations by 1997 allowed early democratization efforts to falter. The
United Nations under Kofi Annan’s leadership initiated intricate internal
negotiations and in July 1998, again with international monitors present,
another controversial election was held, won by Hun Sen. The United
Nations also provided technical assistance for municipal and parliamentary
elections in 2002–2003. But continuing human rights violations early in the
century, and Cambodia’s unwillingness to address the human rights horrors
of the Pol Pot regime postponed democracy’s achievement. By 2006 the
United Nations and the Cambodian government had only reached agreement in principle to establish a war crimes tribunal to hold responsible those
accountable for the 1.5 million Cambodians who were executed or who died
from starvation and disease during the rule of the Khmer Rouge.
The Namibian experience, coupled with early progress on Cambodia and
the successful 1991 American-led UN liberation of Kuwait, produced a
euphoric belief in the promise of the UN’s capability to insure international
peace and security and to rebuild states along democratic lines. In each of
these cases the United States lent its full support for UN action. In Cambodia particularly Washington was willing to delegate responsibility to the
United Nations 4 and to provide sufficient financial support. There was a
growing “institutionalization” of the United Nations in American foreign
policy during George H.W. Bush’s presidency. In the Gulf War, the president
had demonstrated the viability of the United Nations. In its aftermath, UN
procedures and structures increasingly seemed to be appropriate venues for
decision-making, even if that meant some limitation on unilateral action, or
if it meant that outside actors such as the secretary-general would set the
agenda for international attention and action.
Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace was not dramatically different from an
emerging “Bush Doctrine” in US foreign policy. Enshrined as “the new world
order,” the doctrine envisioned a liberal and internationalist America willing
to lead a multilateral coalition of great powers through UN auspices to end

3)
4)

Dobbins et al. 2004, p. 85.
Inoguchi 2000, p. 284.
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aggression in the third world, solve disputes by peaceful negotiation, and
intervene to ameliorate humanitarian disasters. In 1988, the year George
Bush won the presidency, there were fewer than 10,000 UN peacekeepers on
duty in world hot spots, costing the United Nations $364 million annually.5
By June 1992 the number of peacekeepers had risen to 44,000, and it would
approach 80,000 shortly after president Clinton’s inauguration. The total
cost would also rise dramatically to $4 billion a year. The new world order
was being policed by UN-authorized peacekeeping forces largely initiated by
US efforts in the service of humanitarian and democratic nation-building
purposes around the world.
With the growing acceptance of a single template for good governance –
the western Lockean model of representative government – the UN General
Assembly in April 1992 created the Electoral Assistance Division in the UN
secretariat.6 In addition to democratic initiatives in peacekeeping operations,
the division reviewed country requests for electoral assistance, developed
operational strategies in cooperation with other UN agencies to hold national
and municipal elections, provided substantive advice and guidance on electoral matters to member states, and worked with civil society actors to create
a vibrant democratic process. It also worked closely with regional international organizations and non-governmental organizations, including American entities such as the Carter Center to promote democratic election
procedures. UN democracy initiatives included the protection of opposition
factions, the political mobilization of marginalized groups, and the restoration or creation of judicial institutions in order to assure the rule of law and
the defense of individual liberties. By June 2004, 101 nations had requested
UN electoral assistance, and the United Nations had provided support in
91 cases, including troubled places such as Mozambique, Palestine, Bosnia,
and Angola.
In addition to the Electoral Assistance Division, a companion office was
created in the UN Development Programme (UNDP): the Management,
Development and Governance Division. By 2000 one third of the UNDP
budget went toward democracy promotion.7 In 2001 alone the UN Development Programme spent $800 million in 145 countries on democratic governance projects. Among these were funds for national elections in Sierra

5)
6)
7)

Staff Report, US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 1993, p. viii.
A/RES/46/137, 17 December 1991.
Burnell 2000, pp. 51–52.
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Leone, enhanced public participation in Nigeria, and a judicial commission
in Afghanistan to restore its justice system.8 Additionally, UN resolutions,
statements of secretaries-general, and world conferences all reinforced democratic nation-building as a primary task of the United Nations. The General
Assembly passed a series of “election resolutions”9 and “democracy resolutions”10 between 1988 and 1998.
With these resolutions, however, a broadening understanding of democracy emerged in UN deliberations. GA Resolution 31 in November of 1998
defined the UN democratization effort in troubled states in comprehensive
terms, calling for “building a political culture through human rights observance, mobilization of civil society, electoral assistance, free and independent
media, enhancing the rule of law, and improving accountability, transparency, and the quality of public sector management and democratic structures
of government.”11 In the summer of 1993 the United Nations convened the
World Conference on Human Rights, also known as the Vienna Conference,
which highlighted the links among development, democracy and the promotion of human rights.
The 1996 election of Kofi Annan as the UN’s seventh secretary-general
brought to the office an advocate of the Kantian thesis that democracies do
not wage war with each other. He also held a more comprehensive view of
democratic society than contemplated by the representational model of
European and American discourse. He promoted the concept of “personal
sovereignty,” which the secretary-general argued required intercession in
non-democratic states that did not protect the rights of their citizens.
Defending the new era of nation-building, he made the case that “surely no
legal principle – not even [state] sovereignty – can ever shield crimes against
humanity.” There is a “moral duty” for the United Nations to intervene on
behalf of the individual.12 At the time of the Millennium Summit in 2000
Kofi Annan acknowledged that the United Nations is a forum for coordinating the interests and behavior of states, but he asserted it is something more

8)

Brown 2003, pp. 143–144.
A/RES/43/157, 8 December 1988; A/RES/44/146, 15 December 1989; A/RES/52/129,
12 December 1997.
10)
A/RES/50/133, 20 December 1995; A/RES/51/31, 6 December 1996; A/RES/52/18,
21 November 1997.
11)
A/R0ES/53/31, 23 November 1998.
12)
Annan 2000, p. 48.
9)
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than this. “Even though the United Nations is an organization of states,” he
said, “the Charter is written in the name of ‘We the peoples.’ It reaffirms the
dignity and worth of the human person, respect for human rights and the
equal rights of men and women, and a commitment to social progress . . . in
freedom from want and fear alike.”13
The Millennium Summit proved a watershed in the UN’s redefinition of
democracy promotion. The Summit’s declaration endorsed a combination
of development, human rights, and democratization targets. Member governments proclaimed “We shall spare no effort to promote democracy and
strengthen the rule of law, as well as respect . . . all internationally recognized
human rights and fundamental freedoms, . . . to strengthen the capacity of all
our countries to implement the principles and practices of democracy and
respect for human rights, including minority rights . . . [and] to work collectively for more inclusive political processes, allowing genuine participation
by all citizens in all our countries.”
The late Sergio Vieiro de Mello, former UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights, described the UN effort to create “holistic democracy” to
the Commission on Human Rights in April 2003, eight months before his
death in the bombing of the UN’s Baghdad headquarters. He defined democracy as “normatively grounded,”14 and inclusive of both procedural and substantive rights. Democracy in UN parlance is encapsulated in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (1948), and the International Covenants on
Political and Civil Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(1966), and thus encompases “formal institutions and informal processes,
majorities and minorities, males and females, governments and civil society,
the political and economic, the national and international . . . the interdependence of human rights and the rights they defend . . . the principle and right
of self-determination . . . as well as the rights to an adequate standard of living
and to education.”15 Thus, the UN conception of democracy goes well
beyond the usual western definition to include social and economic obligations on the part of the state to its citizens.

13)

Annan 2000, p. 7.
Report of the high Commissioner for Human Rights, E/CN/.4/2003/59, 27 January
2003, paragraph 3.
15)
Report of the high Commissioner for Human Rights, E/CN/.4/2003/59, 27 January
2003, paragraph 3.
14)
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Evolving US Support for Democratic Nation-Building
The United Nations undertook a precedent-setting initiative to implant
democracy in Somalia. In December 1992, the Security Council, using its
enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, authorized
intervention led by the United States. Without the invitation of the domestic government, the Council sent forces not only to provide humanitarian
assistance and security, but also to restore political stability, the rule of law, a
functioning democracy, and reconciliation among ethnic groups. As a result,
in February 2000, the UN facilitated a peace conference in Djibouti that led
to the election of a new Somali president and national assembly, and the creation of a Transitional National Government. The Somali model of intervention under Chapter VII was replicated with varying degrees of success
over the next twelve years in Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo, East Timor, Afghanistan, and Liberia.
Despite warnings from his advisers that the United States could be caught
up in a civil war with little meaning for national interests, president George
H.W. Bush responded to a plea from UN secretary-general Boutros-Ghali to
assist the existing peacekeeping mission in the country (UNOSOM I) by
moving stores of food from Mogadishu to the starving millions in the countryside.16 By fall 1992, a half million Somalis had died from war, disease and
starvation, including nearly one quarter of Somali children in the southern
region of the country.17 The American-led operation was expected to be
short-term and quickly turned over to UN administration (UNOSOM II).
President Bush expressed his hope that US forces would already be withdrawing from Somalia as president-elect Clinton was inaugurated.
That was not to happen. A self-styled “pragmatic Wilsonian,” Clinton
picked up in January 1993 where his predecessor had left off. He encouraged
an expansive role for the United Nations, arguing to the American people
that multilateralism through the UN held the best opportunity for burdensharing and global security. In his first address to the General Assembly he
said, “I hope the United States will always be willing to do its part” in support of UN peacekeeping operations. However, events in Somalia, coupled
with the continuing crisis in the Balkans and a new conservative Republican

16)
For a full discussion of president Bush’s “moralist” motivations for sending troops to
Somalia, see Burgess 1997.
17)
For a complete history and analysis of the UN effort in Somalia and the American intervention, see Hirsch and Oakley 1995.
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majority winning control of both houses of Congress in 1994 tested, and
ultimately undermined that commitment. In the wake of these events the
administration was not only more cautious about democratic nation-building,
but more demanding of fundamental reform of the United Nations.
Pressured by the UN secretary-general to expand the Somali mission from
the relatively limited mandate of providing a secure environment for humanitarian relief to a full-fledged effort at political reconciliation and the creation of democratic government, president Clinton made no immediate
effort to extricate US forces. His commitment reflected the new “assertive
multilateralism”18 espoused by UN ambassador Madeleine Albright. While
recognizing that the United States could not “respond to every alarm,”19 and
that “there was no magic formula,”20 Clinton and his advisers looked to international cooperation through UN mechanisms, particularly to the UN
Security Council’s permanent members, as the initial step in resolving postCold War conflict.
The UN multilateral force of 28,000 troops had a contingent of 4,000 US
personnel under UN command, including a 1,300 man American Quick
Reaction Force. The Security Council directed UNOSOM II to disarm the
warlords and begin the nation-building process.21 Albright lauded the UN
action, hailing it as “an unprecedented enterprise and nothing less than the
restoration of an entire country.”22 Her boss, secretary of state Christopher,
noted that “for the first time there will be a sturdy American role to help the
United Nations rebuild a viable nation-state.”23
The “enemy” for the United Nations in Somalia quickly became General
Mohamed Farah Aideed, one of the primary competitors for power, and
“warlord” of the most powerful faction in Mogadishu. Aideed’s forces
ambushed and killed two dozen Pakistani peacekeepers on June 5, 1993.

18)
Albright first used the term in testimony before the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations and Human Rights in June,
1993. While continuing to endorse its underlying sentiment, Albright later referred to the
term as “without appeal,” and as “the sound bite that bit me.” Albright 2003, p. 176.
19)
Statement Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 13 January 1993, as reprinted
in Christopher 1998, p. 27.
20)
Statement Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 13 January 1993, as reprinted
in Christopher 1998, p. 27.
21)
S/Res/814, 26 March 1993.
22)
See Hyland 1999, p. 56.
23)
Gordon 1993, A7.
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Washington immediately sought a UN resolution ordering the arrest of the
warlord. Both the United Nations and the United States shifted their missions, in a classic case of “mission creep,” to root out the enemies of UN
nation-building in Somalia.24
Events came to a head on October 3, when eighteen US soldiers were
trapped in a firefight and killed. Americans were presented on the evening
news with pictures of their dead soldiers, one of whom was pulled through
the streets of Mogadishu, apparently by gleeful supporters of Aideed. The
revulsion with American involvement in Somalia (later captured in the popular film Black Hawk Down) was complete. While he would enlarge the US
contingent for the time being, he dropped the search for Aideed and withdrew all US forces within six months. As far as the president was concerned,
there would be no more Somalias.25 After Somalia, the administration did
not use the term “assertive multilateralism” again. Events in Somalia more
than anywhere else moved US foreign policy from the cooperative US–UN
nation-building course and toward a new concern for the dangers the overextension of UN activity could present for American national interests.
The first victim of the post-Somalia caution in Washington was the small
central African state of Rwanda. In April 1994 Rwandan Hutus launched a
well planned massacre of the Tutsi minority. By the time the killing ended in
early summer, more than 800,000 had been slaughtered and more than a
million were in refugee camps outside Rwanda. When the massacres broke
out, the United States proposed that the Security Council cut back, not
enlarge, the number of peacekeepers in the region out of fear for the peacekeepers’ safety. Under pressure from Washington, the Security Council cut
the force to 70 observers.26 The Clinton administration even worried about
the provision of logistical support that might drag Americans into unintended involvement. In the end Washington provided meager resources –
$500 million in relief through the UN High Commissioner for Refugees

24)
Operating essentially independent of UN control, US forces for practical purposes
declared war on Aideed with a surprise helicopter gunship attack on a suspected meeting of
Aideed’s lieutenants on July 12. Then, following the deaths of four US peacekeepers in August,
Clinton augmented the force and redoubled efforts to capture the warlord. See Delaney 2004,
p. 36.
25)
For a description of the shift in sentiment within the White House and State Department,
see Shattuck 2003, pp. 22–40.
26)
S/Res/912, 21 April 1994.
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(UNHCR)27 – and backed a Security Council endorsement of unilateral
French action in Rwanda.
The latter decision would prove to be an important precedent for future
Russian actions in Georgia, the United States in Haiti, the US and NATO in
Kosovo, and Australia in East Timor. The procedure of “subcontracting” –
authorizing a state or group of states to act on behalf of the world community
in the restoration of peace and stability – became a regular feature of Security
Council action following Rwanda. The United States would subsequently
evolve the practice into a mechanism by which it would move toward unilateral intervention followed by a request to the Security Council for the equivalent of a post-dated authorization. President Clinton employed the stratagem in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, and President George W. Bush used it in
Afghanistan and Iraq. The practical logic of subcontracting, however, leads
to independent action by a member state that may or may not be in harmony
with UN goals and practices. For the United States it allowed the emergence
of a separate nation-building and democratization effort in Iraq following
the 2003 war.
The crisis of Rwanda proved to be the nadir of Clinton’s UN peacekeeping policy; what then assistant secretary of state John Shattuck later called
“a catastrophic disengagement.”28 It reflected the near paranoia about US
involvement in conflict situations such as had occurred in Somalia. It
cemented Washington’s antipathy toward Boutros-Ghali and his ambitious
program of democratic nation-building. It also contributed to the deliberations that started to fashion a more consistent administration approach
toward the United Nations, its utility as an instrument for addressing the
civil conflicts of the new millennium, and the merits of tying US democratization interests to UN peacekeeping. With the Rwandan episode the United
States started down the road of developing an independent peacekeeping
strategy that then morphed over two presidencies into unilateral attempts at
democratic nation-building following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001.
Just days after the opening horrific events in Rwanda, the administration
issued Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25), significantly curtailing
the American commitment to UN nation-building operations. The president’s statement confirmed that it was no longer US policy “to expand the

27)
28)

Kuperman 2001, pp. 56–58.
Shattuck 2003, p. 16.
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number of UN peace operations, or US involvement in [them].”29 The policy
established sixteen criteria that had to be met before the United States would
vote for a new peacekeeping operation or directly participate in one. Rwanda
was the first case where the president’s new policy had been applied.
Significantly, PDD-25 also demanded financial reform of the United
Nations itself. The United States proposed a cut in the US assessment for
peacekeeping to 25 percent of the UN budget, and the reform of the UN’s
Department of Peacekeeping Operations. PDD-25 had not started out this
way. Early deliberations were premised on an active commitment to BoutrosGhali’s Agenda for Peace. Nearly a year before PDD-25’s promulgation,
Clinton had signed off on Presidential Review Directive 13 (PRD-13), a
review that leaned toward support for UN command of nation-building
operations and an expanded US role in them. In line with the philosophy of
the emerging document, the administration placed US troops under UN
command for the first time in Macedonia and Somalia.30
Also driving the shift in administration policy was the growing conservative Republican hostility on Capitol Hill toward the UN and toward the
White House’s support of UN nation-building missions, and the divergent
aims of democratization as understood by the United Nations and the United
States. With the 1994 congressional elections looming, Republicans saw in
the Somalia fiasco an opportunity to attack administration policy. The
minority leader in the House Representatives, Dick Armey of Texas, argued
that the nation “had gone too far in the direction of globalism.”31 Republicans introduced the National Security Revitalization Act, which required
the administration to seek congressional approval for the commitment of
forces to UN peacekeeping. In the Senate minority leader Robert Dole introduced the Peace Powers Act that restated the language of the 1945 UN Participation Act requiring congressional approval for providing US military
units to the Security Council. Both Houses, moreover, appropriated far less
than the president requested for peacekeeping operations.32 The House and
Senate were ready for a fight with the administration over any continuing US
support for UN nation-building.

29)

White House 1994.
For a critical review of PRD-13, see Rodman 1994, p. 32. On the matter of US troops in
Macedonia and Somalia, see Smith and Preston 1993.
31)
Hendrickson 1998, p. 243.
32)
Browne 2003.
30)
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Definitional Dissonance
By the time of Bill Clinton’s second inauguration the United States government was well on its way to developing its own democratic nation-building
apparatus and modus operandi in the service of its classical liberal conception
of democracy. The last decade has witnessed an American effort at democracy construction unequaled since the end of World War II, little of it under
the auspices of the United Nations, most of it either through multilateral
devices outside the UN system or through unilateral action. Faced with
strong criticism from conservatives in Congress, president Clinton decided
to proceed in Bosnia and Haiti for all practical purposes unilaterally, to cut
the number of servicemen under UN command drastically,33 and to demand
a change in leadership at the United Nations when the secretary-general’s
term ended in 1997.
In the case of Haiti, while the president sought and got a UN Security
Council authorization,34 the White House determined the policy and tactics
to remove the military junta that had overthrown democratically elected
president Jean Bertrand Aristide. Using what secretary of state Warren Christopher characterized as “a coalition of the willing,”35 a term heard regularly in
the subsequent Bush administration, the United States returned Aristide to
power in October 1994. The Haitian mission “opened the way for the development of a new doctrine of [US] ‘humanitarian intervention’”36 that would
be used again in Bosnia and Kosovo.
In the wake of Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti, Clinton shifted his attention
from UN-based solutions to the military option available in a refocused
NATO. In August 1994 Clinton threatened to lift unilaterally the arms
embargo with the Muslim government in Sarajevo if the latest UN peace
plan was not accepted by Bosnian Serbs. Following the revolting massacre
of Muslim men and boys in the town of Srebrenica in July 1995, NATO
launched substantial and decisive air attacks against Serb emplacements. The
United Nations was left out of the decision-making.

33)

This trend would continue under the subsequent administration of George W. Bush. By
October 2004 there were only 28 US military personnel serving under UN command in a
total of five UN operations. Serafino 2004.
34)
S/Res/940, 31 July 1994.
35)
Christopher 1998, p. 182.
36)
Shattuck 2003, p. 287. This is also the assessment to be found in Gordon 1994, p. 134.
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Invited by Clinton to Dayton, Ohio, the leaders of Serbia, Croatia, and
Bosnia hammered out the Dayton Accords,37 an American imposed settlement that assured security in Bosnia. In the Accords, all parties agreed to
establish a permanent ceasefire in Bosnia, repatriate refugees, and create a
multiethnic democratic state with a tripartite presidency and autonomous
ethnic enclaves. The attempt to reestablish peace, stability, and democracy in
the Balkans became an American responsibility. The president also came
under increasing pressure to capture indicted war criminals and deliver them
to the UN war crimes tribunal in The Hague. The United Nations was given
a minor role in post-conflict Bosnia. In Kosovo, the UN role would be larger
following the 1999 NATO intervention. UNMIK (UN Mission in Kosovo)
would oversee day-to-day civil government in the province, but the decision
to intervene, security strategy, and the outline of how to proceed with
democratization were all decided in Washington.
Democratization is a complex process with which the United States had
had little practice by the turn of the century. As a recent RAND study 38
found, American efforts to convert authoritarian or failed states to stable
democracy requires extensive manpower, significant funds,39 and a bureaucratic architecture for its success. Having not undertaken democracy promotion since the immediate post World War II days, the United States had to
start from scratch in the 1990s once it abandoned the UN structures. The
lead agencies in Washington for this purpose quickly became the Agency for
International Development (USAID), the United States Information
Agency (USIA), and the United States Information Service (USIS).40
USAID focused on traditional liberal procedural democratic practices:
encouraging the rule of law, promoting competitive elections and political
processes, developing civil society, and promoting good governance. Spending
only $722 million in 2003,41 its resources amounted to a mere 9 per cent of
total US development assistance, which in turn, when compared to other
donor nations, is the lowest share of GNP (0.11% in 2001) of any developed

37)

For the complete history of the Dayton Accords, see Holbrooke 1998.
Dobbins 2004.
39)
This judgment is confirmed in Joyner 2002, pp. 169–170.
40)
For a full discussion of the role of these agencies in democracy promotion see Hearn and
Robinson 2000, pp. 241–262.
41)
Finkel et al. 2006, p. 26.
38)
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nation. Democracy aid has also been dispersed over 121 nations since 1990,42
diluting its impact in specific and important cases.
External to the federal government, US democracy promotion funds have
been funneled through non-governmental organizations, particularly the
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI). The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) disperses funds approved by Congress to these organizations as
well as to the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) and the
American Center for International Labor Solidarity (ACILS). Largely
headed by former officials in the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations,
these NGOs support technical programs in more than 100 countries to promote party development and electoral systems, complementing and sometimes duplicating UN efforts through its Election Assistance Division.
Particularly the IRI has been closely associated with conservative Republican
efforts to promote American-based democracy programs unconnected to
UN projects.
The American definition of democratization at the new millennium still
held to narrower criteria than the holistic view put forward by the United
Nations. A 2006 study for USAID measured democratization in terms of
progress on voting rights, participation, electoral competitiveness, civil liberties, procedural vitality of civil society, decentralized governance, government effectiveness, corruption, and human rights.43 The study, conducted by
a team at Vanderbilt University, concluded that US aid on all of these indicators, with the exception of human rights, had a modest positive correlation.
In the case of human rights, US assistance had a negative impact.44 Not
included in US interpretations of democracy promotion was the need to
promote group rights, gender equality, or any of the social and economic
targets of the Millennium Development Goals.
At the new millennium the US government was promoting both inside
the UN system and beyond its structures a new democracy movement,
including an effort to create intergovernmental fora for democratic states
only. The most important initiative was the Community of Democracies
(CoD), which many critics of the United Nations conceptualized as an
alternative international organization for promoting US global democratic
goals. Strongly encouraged by the US government, in June 2000 more than
42)
43)
44)

Finkel et al. 2006, p. 14.
Finkel et al. 2006, pp. 95–96.
Finkel et al. 2006, p. 2.
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100 nations issued the Warsaw Declaration founding the intergovernmental
group. As contemplated by the US State Department the CoD could improve
UN resolutions and activities in democracy promotion and serve as a “supplementary network”45 for democratization. The Community dedicated
itself to “the continuous development of democracy domestically and the
promotion of democracy regionally and globally,”46 but studiously avoided
defining the United Nations as a key organ in the democratic movement. In
a “Dialogue on Democracy” on 5-6 June 2003 participating states urged the
CoD to “use sub-regional organizations (SADC, ECOWAS, CARICOM,
MERCOSUR, and others) to promote democratic development, prevent
backsliding, and address challenges to democracy,”47 and to employ them “as
a vehicle to address transnational problems that also threaten democracy, i.e.
public health concerns, narco-trafficking, terrorism, etc.”48 No mention of
the United Nations appeared in the final communiqué.
On 1 November 2004, the CoD convened in New York and established
the Democratic Caucus of the United Nations. Avowedly created to promote reform in the United Nations, the caucus emphasized the promotion
of democratic principles in UN work. The caucus became an important tool
of US policy in its effort to replace the UN Commission on Human Rights
with a reformed Council with a membership of only pro-democracy states
with strong human rights records. The election in 2000 of a conservative
Republican administration that was cool if not hostile toward the United
Nations and its nation-building missions only accelerated the separation
between the democratization programs of the United Nations and the
United States.

The US–UN Relationship
American foreign policy toward UN nation-building has an evolutionary
quality to it, moving from the long-felt desire to see an active and effective
United Nations right the problems of world affairs to a nearly unilateral
45)

US Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs Release, September 27, 2004.
Joint Press Communiqué, Community of Democracies Convening Group’ Ministerial
Meeting, New York, September 26, 2003, at the 58th UN General Assembly.
47)
US State Department Release. “Dialogue on Democracy: Summation of Best Practices and
Key Ideas, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/democ/21692.htm.
48)
US State Department Release. “Dialogue on Democracy: Summation of Best Practices and
Key Ideas, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/democ/21692.htm.
46)
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American response. The two year period from the deaths of the marines in
the streets of Mogadishu, Somalia, in October 1993 to the resolution in
October 1995 of the conflict that had rained mortars on Sarajevo, Bosnia,
witnessed the development of a new strategy for addressing the humanitarian crises of the time, and of a new critical approach to the UN. Concomitant with the change in American policy came an American demand for UN
reform and a change in the world body’s leadership by the Clinton administration. President George W. Bush pushed the divide between the United
Nations and the United States even wider.
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the president’s war on terrorism was
an overwhelming unilateral initiative. There was strong multilateral support
for Washington’s decision to remove the Taliban from power in Afghanistan,
curtail Al Qaeda activities there, and seek the democratic reconstruction of
the country. But Afghanistan slipped from the front pages of the world’s
newspapers as the Bush administration announced that nations were “either
with us or against us,” that there were some unwelcome nations who made up
an “axis of evil,” and that one of them – Iraq – needed to be struck immediately, preemptively, even unilaterally if the other members of the Security
Council refused to accede to US demands for military action.
Despite the challenge of Afghanistan, attention in Washington shifted to
Iraq. During much of 2002 and into early 2003, disagreements within the
Security Council on the reasonableness of war with Iraq became public.
Washington warned of the certain “irrelevancy” of the UN should the Security Council fail to accede to war. In June 2002, Bush asserted a new foreign
policy of preemption, coupling fundamental US security concerns with the
need for “regime change” in Baghdad. In succeeding months the president
further defined US goals in Iraq and in the wider Middle East in terms of
bringing about democratic regimes.
In March 2003, the United States with a “coalition of the willing” invaded
Iraq, but without an authorizing UN resolution. While the US seemed to
“win” the 2003 war in Iraq, postwar challenges proved more intractable than
originally thought. Francis Fukuyama has concluded that “this was due in
part to the unilateral way in which the administration went into war, which
left it mostly bereft of international partners for its effort, and in part to
internal bureaucratic struggles that left organization of the reconstruction
effort in the hands of the Pentagon.”49 The Defense Department’s first

49)

Fukuyama 2004.
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administrator in Iraq, retired general Jay Garner, rejected his own adviser’s
admonition that it would “take a little longer to do democratization than
three of four months in the summer in Baghdad.”50 Garner hoped to convene
quickly a national conference and forge a unity government, largely drawing
on emigré Iraqi politicians to fill key posts.
When Garner’s unrealistic efforts proved disappointing, he was replaced
by L. Paul Bremer. Bremer was no fan of a UN role in Iraqi democracybuilding. Even after the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1483 legitimizing the occupation, Bremer gave only the slightest regard to the resolution’s
requirement that the Coalition Provisional Authority work “intensively”
with the secretary-general’s special representative, Sergio Vieira de Mello.51
By spring 2004, more than 800 Americans had been killed in the country,
and over 80 per cent of those deaths had occurred after president Bush
announced the end of combat on May 1, 2003 (compared to about 120
American deaths in Afghanistan over a longer period of involvement). The
usefulness of unilateral “preemption” and American-dominated democratization efforts outside the sanction of the United Nations were at the least
open to debate. In March, American Iraqi policy shifted abruptly,52 as officials announced the US intention to transfer sovereignty to an interim Iraqi
government – a government selected by secretary-general Annan’s special
representative Lahkdar Brahimi. Ambassador Brahimi conducted delicate
negotiations among the various Iraqi political groupings, the CPA, the leaders of the interim transitional government and produced an agreement on an
interim government made up of a president, two vice presidents, a prime
minister, and a council of ministers. The United Nations then set up the
process that led to January 2005 elections and a subsequent constitutional
referendum. None of this, however, brought consolidated democracy to Iraq.
Sectarian divisions, insurgency, a narrow definition of democracy by the government in Washington, and continuing American occupation hindered
achievement of a democratic Iraq.

50)

Reported in Diamond 2005, p. 32.
The UN mission was left poorly defended and to its own agenda. When de Mello and
21 of his colleagues were killed in the August 2003 bombing of the UN’s Baghdad headquarters, the secretary-general withdrew the UN presence from Iraq completely. Among other
demands, Annan insisted that sovereignty be transferred to the Iraqis before the United
Nations injected itself again into the democratization effort.
52)
Phillips 2005, p. 205.
51)
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The Merits of Convergence
The “negotiation” that went on between the United States and the United
Nations concerning the role the latter would play in Iraqi democratization
was emblematic of the new relationship between an international organization, with an inclusive perception of democracy and its own democracy
promotion program, and its most important member. International organizations, made up of sovereign states, are often described as creatures of their
memberships, unable to act independently of the will of their members. By
the 21st century the United Nations, or at least its secretariat, had emerged
as an independent actor. This independence was challenged by an administration in Washington that believed deeply in its own variant of global
democratization, unilateral American power, and the dysfunctionality of the
United Nations. In 2003 the mix of competing interests produced a standoff
that put the United Nations at what Kofi Annan called “a fork in the road,”
with the world body limited in what it might do to address the dangers of the
time, and the United States seeking tighter budgetary and administrative
control over UN nation-building.
While not perfect by any criteria, the UN track record on democratic
nation-building has been reasonably good, certainly better than unilateral
American efforts in Iraq. Beginning with Namibia in the 1980s, the United
Nations has sought to impose a transitional administration on fragmented
states, overseeing the entire political process. Simon Chesterman has characterized this procedure as “benevolent autocracy.”53 It is a contradictory process to be sure, for it “imposes” democracy. Yet, most studies demonstrate
qualified success. Table 1 uses the criteria established by Freedom House to
measure levels of democratization. Comparative evaluations are taken from
the Polity IV Project at the University of Maryland. When significant
resources and lengthy international commitment are given to UN nationbuilding missions, such as in Namibia, East Timor, and El Salvador, there
seems to be significant progress on consolidating democratic societies. The
outcome of American efforts seems more problematic.
In the case of Iraq the American inability to rally international support,
and its unwillingness to provide sufficient funds, to put experienced nationbuilders in the field, to see democratization as a process inclusive of social
and economic goods, and to employ a strategy that does not create a backlash
to perceived imperialist ambitions have undermined good US intentions.
53)

See Newman and Rich 2004, p. 12.
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Table 1 Democratization in states with nation-building operations
listed in chronological order by date of UN Security Council authorization
Country

Polity IV

Freedom House
(0 low, 10 high)

Congo
Namibia
El Salvador
Cambodia
Somalia
Haiti
Mozambique
Bosnia
Eastern Slavonia
Sierra Leone
East Timor
Kosovo
Afghanistan
Iraq

0.0
6.0
3.0
3.0
–
1.0
6.0
–
7.0
5.0
6.0
–
–
0.0

2.9
8.6
8.6
2.9
2.9
2.0
2.9
5.7
8.6
5.7
7.1
–
2.9
1.4

Source: Dobbins, Jones, Crane, Rathmell, Steele, and Teltschik 2004, p. xxii.

The divergent American path has forced demands for reform of the UN, but
the reality may be that the lack of US support for UN efforts54 may be the
heart of limited effectiveness on both sides.
Beginning with the intervention in Somalia the UN Security Council
“subcontracted” a second-generation peacekeeping operation to the United
States. This strategy calls upon a member state or regional group of states to
lead a UN intervention force. In addition to Somalia, subcontracting has
been employed in East Timor, Georgia, Rwanda, Afghanistan, and Sudan.
But subcontracting nation-building missions in essence grants broad latitude
to the intervening nations to conduct operations as they see fit. It is a short
step from acting on behalf of the world community and with its grant of
legitimacy to acting unilaterally and without practical accountability. In the
case of the United States, which had been developing its own democratization programs during the 1990s, subcontracting evolved in practical terms
54)

On this point, see Joyner 2002, p. 169.
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into wholly constructed US democracy-building efforts subject to little
international accountability. Without perceived international authorization,
US democracy promotion cannot be expected to succeed in settings such
as Iraq.
The divide between Washington and New York over democratization
holds a serious threat to the future of the United Nations itself. Beyond the
US demands for UN reform and the important challenge to collective security that American unilateral intervention portends, for the first time since
1945 the UN’s most important member has taken the first steps toward the
construction of an alternative multilateral structure, one more in perceived
harmony with the US vision of democratization. The creation of the Community of Democracies and the Democracy Caucus represent the subtle
entertainment of the notion that the promotion of global peace through the
march of democracy might be better served through a new international
organizational alternative to the 60 year old postwar United Nations. This is
a challenge not only to the organization but also to the major powers of
Europe and Asia that see in the United Nations a counterweight to the
extraordinary global power of the United States.
Whether the UN-US relationship can be repaired before serious damage
is done to the democratization efforts of both Washington and the United
Nations and to the UN as an institution turns in large part on the evolution
of presidential policy. The division between the United States and the United
Nations is not simply explained by party, ideology, or domestic politics. The
divergence began during the Clinton administration and has only widened
in the Bush years. However, the difficulty of promoting democracy in Iraq
and the subsequent turn to the United Nations for assistance holds hope for
further evolution, a closing of the gap. Democracy-building legitimized and
largely administered by the United Nations appears to present the best
chance for success, especially when it is funded, endorsed, and assisted by the
world’s most significant powers, most particularly by the United States.
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